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Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?
Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2007
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277777
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Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?
Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Department of Management, … - 2007
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227331
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Raymond, James; Werker, Eric - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302713
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329898
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332994
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The costs of favoritism: is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269460
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The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel (contributor) - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336343
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Raymond, James; Werker, Eric - Center for European, Governance and Economic … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010954407
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Raymond, James; Werker, Eric - Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the … - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540621
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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - Courant Research Centre PEG - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that … politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of … – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540625