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Optimal auction design under non-commitment
Skreta, Basilikē - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 854-890
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549258
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Make a guess : a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma
Qin, Cheng-zhong; Yang, Chun-lei - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 39 (2009) 2, pp. 259-268
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812492
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On the informed seller problem : optimal information disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Review of economic design : RED 15 (2011) 1, pp. 1-36
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903399
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On the informed seller problem : optimal information disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505104
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On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
Galavotti, Stefano; Muto, Nozomu; Oyama, Daisuke - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 48 (2011) 1, pp. 87-123
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009266938
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Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
Figueroa, Nicolás; Skreta, Vasiliki - In: Review of economic design : RED 15 (2011) 3, pp. 213-243
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267492
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On the Informed Seller Problem : Optimal Information Disclosure
Skreta, Vasiliki - 2008
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell herobject(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyersiacute;valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him, but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769869
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Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers : an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
Guo, Huiyi - In: Journal of economic theory 183 (2019), pp. 76-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131296
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Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan - In: Games and economic behavior 123 (2020), pp. 327-341
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430766
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A very robust auction mechanism
MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819271