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Incomplete contracts as a screening device in competing vertical inter-firm relationships
Sicoli, Marta; Sorge, Marco M. - In: Revue d'économie industrielle 147 (2014) 3, pp. 141-181
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425493
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Endogenous market structures and contract theory : delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying
Etro, Federico - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426345
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Sequential, multi-dimensional screening
Litterscheid, Sina - In: Essays on contracts, mechanisms and information revelation, (pp. 55-117). 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500892
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Mechanism design by an informed principal : private values with transferable utility
Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - In: The review of economic studies 81 (2014) 4, pp. 1668-1707
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485820
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The benefits of sequential screening
Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388233
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Information and delay in an agency model
Drugov, Mikhail - In: The Rand journal of economics 41 (2010) 3, pp. 598-615
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009237720
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Die Erstemission von Aktien, die Wahl des Abschlussprüfers und das Underpricing-Phänomen : eine empirische Analyse im Kontext der Agency- und Signalling-Theorie
Möller, Manuela - In: Die Betriebswirtschaft : DBW 71 (2011) 2, pp. 155-188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936301
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Signaling through the 2008 Beijing Olympics - using mega sport events to change the perception and image of the host
Preuß, Holger; Alfs, Christian - In: European Sport management quarterly : ESMQ 11 (2011) 1, pp. 55-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008937438
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Career concerns incentives : an experimental test
Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003800694
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Optimal deterrence when judgment-proof agents are paid in arrears : with an application to online advertising fraud
Edelman, Benjamin (contributor) - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003722773