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Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric

Grossmann, Volker - 2003

This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms? performance. Despite an exante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261934

An Experimental Test of Career Concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht; Raab, Philippe - 2004

Holmström?s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers?...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262147

Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?

Lazear, Edward P. - 2003

of the typical American firm. Variable pay is usually touted as a way to provide incentives to managers whose interests … received much attention, but is consistent with many of the facts, is selection. Managers and industry specialists may have … information about a firm?s prospects that is unavailable to outside investors. In order to induce managers to be truthful about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262719

Leadership Skills and Wages

Kuhn, Peter; Weinberger, Catherine - 2002

American business seems to be infatuated with its workers? ?leadership? skills. Is there such a thing, and is it rewarded in labor markets? Using the Project Talent, NLS72 and High School and Beyond datasets, we show that men who occupied leadership positions in high school earn more as adults,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262770

An experimental test of career concerns

Morgenstern, Albrecht; Koch, Alexander Karl; Raab, Philippe - 2004

Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263116

Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure in U.S. Commercial Banking

Hughes, Joseph P.; Lang, William W.; Moon, Choon-Geol; … - 2004

We extend the literature on the effects of managerial entrenchment to consider how safety-net subsidies and financial distress costs interact with managerial incentives to influence capital structure in U.S. commercial banking. Using cross-sectional data on publicly traded, highest-level U.S....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263221

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation : executives are paid for (good) luck but not punished for bad

Garvey, Gerald T.; Milbourn, Todd T. - 2003

market-determined return for risk-bearing. We then reformulate the argument in a more appropriate fashion. If managers can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263289

Board Independence and CEO Turnover

Laux, Volker - 2005

It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263315

The Boundary of the Firm in a Model of Trade Within a Hierarchy

Levy, Nadav - 2003

-world multidivisional firms: Operative decisions are in the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the … performance of their units; Managers' decisions are subject to approval and intervention by the top management of the firm; and … managers are better informed regarding the affairs of their divisions than their superiors in the firm's hierarchy. In this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263343

Questions Cooperative Directors Should Be Asking Management

Anderson, Bruce L.; Henehan, Brian M. - 2002

The most important responsibility of cooperative directors is to judiciously ask the right questions of management. It has been suggested that some directors do not know all of the correct questions to ask of management, or how. The purpose of this paper is fourfold: 1) To briefly describe how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263356