We analyze the impact of records of denied and withdrawn customer complaints on job separation in a dataset based on FINRA's Broker-Check database with more than 3 mio. financial advisers. Compared to misconduct that actually leads to a conviction of the adviser, denied and withdrawn complaints...

Kirchliche Arbeitgeber diskriminieren ihre Beschäftigten und Bewerber nach Merkmalen, nach denen andere Arbeitsgeber es nicht dürfen und meist auch nicht mehr wollen. Denn die Kirchen schaden sich damit vor allem selbst, während die Diskriminierten inzwischen anderswo willkommen sind und gute...

Women in economics follow different career paths than men, facing differential treatment when it comes to journal acceptance as well as promotion. We focus on a selfdirected measure of productivity: working paper output. This avoids potential sex biases in the peer-review process. We find that...

I measure statistical differences in personality characteristics (personality traits, attitudes, and values) between individuals with an ethnic minority vs. ethnic majority background. This analysis might inform research on explanations of discrimination, as some researchers have proposed that...

Firms in border regions typically deal with heterogeneous applicant pools that include both (foreign) domestic workers and cross-border commuters. However, we know little about recruiters' workforce needs and hiring practices in cross-border labour markets. Based on a survey of real recruiters...

We study how salary history disclosures affect employer demand, and how salary history bans shape hiring and wages. We show how these effects depend on the properties of the labor market, and we measure the key properties using a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our field experiment features...

We study minority representation in the workplace when employers engage in optimal sequential search and minorities convey noisier signals of ability than mainstream job candidates. The greater signal noise makes it harder for minorities to change employers' prior beliefs. When employers are...

This paper studies labor market discriminations as an agency problem. It sets up a principal-agent model of a firm, where the manager is a taste discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder’s profits because workers differ in skills. The paper...

This paper studies labour market discriminations as an agency problem. It sets up a principal-agent model of a firm, where the manager is a taste discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder’s profits because workers differ in skills. The paper...

This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria...