Every month, millions of workers search for new jobs although they already have one. About one-tenth of these searchers switch employers in the following month. However, most of the job switchers in the United States never reported having looked for a job. This implies that, rather than those...

Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers' demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates' likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel,...

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We...

Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers' demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates' likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel,...

Whose preferences drive labor market sorting? We present a simple model of hiring that illustrates the role of intermediaries, worker preferences and employer preferences. These factors are unaccounted for in traditional resume audit studies, leading to ambiguity about interpretation. We...

We study the design of managerial practices for matching workers to divisions. Our methods use both sides' preferences to match with each other, and on the employer's expectations about resulting productivities. Our model derives boundary conditions for when dictating assignments outperforms...

We ask how the adoption of artificial intelligence affects teams, their routines, and performance in a laboratory experiment. We randomize the introduction of automated players and new hires into "laboratory firms" (Weber and Camerer, 2003) engaging in a coordination-based game on the Nintendo...

Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers’ demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates’ likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel,...