Based on current say-on-pay voting patterns and empirical evidence for pay-for-performance in the largest 100 US companies, this paper argues that public and shareholder scrutiny of executive compensation will further increase. The result will be much more shareholder rejections of executive...

Summary of findings from analyzing pay and performance for FTSE100 companies from 2009-2011 (3 years). Performance is measured by indexed Total Shareholder Return and indexed Operating Cash Flow Growth. CEO total realized pay is used as the proxy pay metric. The research findings were discussed...

While the current financial crisis has challenged nearly everyone from management to media, it has exposed some fundamental flaws in management pay. In recent years, bonuses have been too high in up-cycles and they now risk being too low in the current downturn. Adopting an investor's...

This paper is a summary of the findings of analyzing pay and performance for the largest 100 companies from 2009-2011 (3 years). Performance is measured by indexed Total Shareholder Return and indexed Operating Cash Flow Growth. CEO total realized pay is used as the pay metric. The research...

Prodded by economists in the 1970s, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEOs with hopes of boosting their companies' fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return...

In this paper, I examine whether longer duration of executive compensation influences investment decisions. I exploit a regulation designed to foster long-term orientation in executive compensation as an exogenous trigger to lengthen executives' incentive duration. I find that treated firms...

CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract...

In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, ob Vorstandsabfindungen von börsennotierten Unternehmen durch die Empfehlung 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Satz 1 des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex in ihrer Höhe begrenzt werden. Die Analyse umfangreicher empirischer Daten zu Entsprechenserklärungen aller...

This paper examines how corporate governance reporting corresponds to actual conduct regarding severance payment caps for prematurely departing members of companies' executive boards in Germany. For this purpose, we first evaluate the declarations of conformity for all companies listed in the...

Empfehlungen zur Beschränkung von Abfindungen an vorzeitig ausscheidende Vorstandsmitglieder werden häufig nicht eingehalten. Solange Vorstandsmitglieder nicht gegen ihren Willen entlassen werden dürfen, ist eine Beschränkung der Abfindungen weder im Interesse der Unternehmen noch effizient....