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In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private...
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This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219131
This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic … analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent … voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory concentrates on lump-sum voluntary transfers, individual or collective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023678
particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506562
particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108831
by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014138684
We introduce a novel approach to studying behavior in repeated games - one that is based on the psychology of play. Our approach is based on the following six "aspects" of a player's behavior: round-1 cooperation, lenience, forgiveness, loyalty, leadership, and following. Using a laboratory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472880
There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207565