We investigate the incentives of a high-quality firm to transfer for free its proprietary product innovation technology to its standard-quality rival on which it has passive partial ownership holdings (PPOs). We identify the conditions under which there exists a non-controlling share to make...

We consider a homogenous good Cournot duopoly, in which a firm owns acost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. Weshow that partial passive ownership holdings may induce licensing via afixed fee and increase consumer surplus, tax revenues, and social...

In a two-tier industry with an upstream monopolist supplier and downstream competition with differentiated goods, we show that passive partial forward integration (PPFI) has ambiguous effects on competition and welfare. When vertical trading is conducted via linear tariffs, PPFI is...

We consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolistsupplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with twodifferentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passivepartial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and...