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The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2004

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335223

The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029351

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Csóka, Péter; Pintér, Miklós - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 143-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431331

The Shapley value for directed graph games

Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Selçuk, Özer; Talman, Dolf - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284534

Supermodular NTU-games

Koševoj, Gleb A.; Suzuki, Takamasa; Talman, Dolf - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285013

Duality for general TU-games redefined

Aslan, Fatma; Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2019

We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012031180