Central exams have been discussed as an incentive to improve educational outcomes. In our paper we study the impact of central exams on labor market outcomes. We explain the quality choice of schools under central and non-central exams and model the resulting students' schooling decisions and...

This paper suggests that a non-binding minimum wage may act as a focal point for tacit collusion in the low-wage markets, pulling down wages of some otherwise higher paid workers. A simple game-theoretic argument explaining the emergence of collusive equilibrium is developed, which is then...

Although there is growing recognition of the contribution of teachers to students' educational outcomes, there are large gaps in our understanding of how teacher labor markets function. Most research on teacher labor markets use models developed for the private sector. However, markets for...

We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regarding productive characteristics of participants. This model is used to understand incentives toward early contracts or unraveling in labor markets for entry-level professionals. We study two...

Although there is growing recognition of the contribution of teachers to students' educational outcomes, there are large gaps in our understanding of how teacher labor markets function. Most research on teacher labor markets use models developed for the private sector. However, markets for...

In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium...

We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regarding productive characteristics of participants. This model is used to understand incentives toward early contracts or unraveling in labor markets for entry-level professionals. We study two...