governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …

. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use … employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about … three main conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon …

model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a … reward management tool whereas bad managers would implement it for entrenchment motives. We bring about three main … conclusions: (i) Bad managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism. (ii) This latter phenomenon increases the cost …

complex than other tools for managing risk, such as covenants or simply cutting back on option pay, and gives managers …

incentive realignment to the cross-coefficient, i.e., to more powerful CEOs. When the average level of ex-post contract change … should be broken out, because the MNS theory is not about newly-hired CEOs new CEOs could not have rigged a previously …