A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kibris, Özgür ; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 18.2014, 3, p. 163-189
|
Subject: | Regional development agencies | Uniform mechanism | Efficiency | Strategy proofness | Fairness | Single peakedness | Regionalentwicklung | Regional development | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Regionalpolitik | Regional policy | Allokation | Allocation |
-
Kıbrıs, Özgür, (2014)
-
When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
Zhang, Jun, (2020)
-
An efficient, computationally tractable school choice mechanism
McLennan, Andrew, (2024)
- More ...
-
Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement : decomposable rules
Kibris, Özgür, (2011)
-
Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias
Tapkı, Ipek Gürsel, (2007)
-
Population monotonicity in public good economies with single dipped preferences
Tapkı, İpek Gürsel, (2016)
- More ...