A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski
| Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques ; Meshalkin, Andrey ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 103.2017, p. 185-198
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| Subject: | Dynamic games | Bargaining | Folk theorem | Subgame perfect equilibrium | One-period recall | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Folk-Theorem | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.006 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792302