An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pe̜ski, Marcin |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 7.2012, 1, p. 25-55
|
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
Truthful equilibria in dynamic Bayesian games
Hörner, Johannes, (2015)
-
The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
Kim, Daehyun, (2022)
-
Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
Sugaya, Takuo, (2015)
- More ...
-
Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games
Pe̜ski, Marcin, (2008)
-
An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
Pe̜ski, Marcin, (2012)
- More ...