Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Au, Pak Hung ; Kawai, Keiichi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 119.2020, p. 56-78
|
Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Information transmission | Multiple senders | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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