Board effectiveness and CEO pay : board information processing capacity, monitoring complexity, and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity
Year of publication: |
May/June 2017
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Authors: | Seo, Jeongil |
Published in: |
Human resource management. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0090-4848, ZDB-ID 83105-0. - Vol. 56.2017, 3, p. 373-388
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Subject: | board information processing capacity | board size | board busyness | monitoring complexity | CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vorstand | Executive board | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance |
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