Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bao, Renjie ; Li, Sanxi ; Yu, Jun |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 119.2020, p. 105-109
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Multitask | Principal-agent model | Task assignment | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard |
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