Central bank transparency about model uncertainty and wage setters
This paper addresses the issue of monetary policy transparency in a context of model uncertainty by adapting the robust control approach. We find that even if the desire of robustness induces an aggressive response of union and central bank, the central bank should reveal its preference about model robustness.
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | SPYROMITROS, Eleftherios ; QIN, Li |
Published in: |
Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 5.2006, 18, p. 1-5
|
Publisher: |
AccessEcon |
Subject: | central bank transparency |
Saved in:
freely available
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