Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Keefer, Philip ; Stasavage, David |
Published in: |
The political economy of monetary institutions. - Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-52414-7. - 2003, p. 59-82
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Wechselkurspolitik | Exchange rate policy | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Theorie | Theory |
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