Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy
Year of publication: |
2005-10
|
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Authors: | Bartolomeo, Giovanni Di ; Acocella, Nicola ; Hallett, Andrew Hughes |
Institutions: | Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Policy games | Policy ineffectiveness | Static controllability | Existence of equilibria | Nash feedback equilibrium |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2005.130 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination |
Source: |
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Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, (2005)
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Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, (2005)
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TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES
Acocella, Nicola, (2005)
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Is There any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies?
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The theory of economic policy in a strategic context
Acocella, Nicola, (2013)
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