Enrollment manipulations in school choice
Year of publication: |
March 2016
|
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Authors: | Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 63.2016, p. 119-125
|
Subject: | Enrollment | Rematching | Manipulation | Boston mechanism | Top Trading Cycles mechanism | Stable mechanisms | Schulauswahl | School choice | Bildungsverhalten | Educational behaviour | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Schule | School |
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