Environmental taxes and strategic delegation

This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which the government chooses an environmental tax to control environmental damage. By giving the managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we show that firm owners have to pay a higher environmental tax and both environmental damage and social welfare increase compared to the profit-maximization case.

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Year of publication:	2002-11-29
Authors:	Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos ; Garzón, María Begoña
Published in:	Spanish Economic Review. - Asociación Española de Economía - AEE. - Vol. 4.2002, 4, p. 301-309
Publisher:	Asociación Española de Economía - AEE
Subject:	Environmental taxes \| managerial incentives \| strategic delegation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Q28 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755511