False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Kempe, David ; Saito, Yasumasa ; Salek, Mahyar ; Yakoo, Makoto |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : third international workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-77104-2. - 2007, p. 245-256
|
Subject: | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Anforderungsprofil | Occupational profile | Theorie | Theory |
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