Executive compensation as an agency problem
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian A. ; Fried, Jesse M. |
Published in: |
The journal of economic perspectives : EP ; a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Association, ISSN 0895-3309, ZDB-ID 623018-0. - Vol. 17.2003, 3, p. 71-92
|
Subject: | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | USA | United States |
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