Extremal incentive compatible transfers
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Kos, Nenad ; Messner, Matthias |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 148.2013, 1, p. 134-164
|
Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Einnahmen | Revenue | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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