Eyes on the prize : do industry tournament incentives shape the structure of executive compensation?
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Islam, Emdad ; Rahman, Lubna ; Sen, Rik ; Zein, Jason |
Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - Seattle, Wash. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1756-6916, ZDB-ID 2010249-5. - Vol. 57.2022, 5, p. 1929-1959
|
Subject: | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Arbeitsplatzwechsel | Job changing | Wettbewerb | Competition | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | USA | United States |
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