Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Rachmilevitch, Shiran |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 86.2019, 3/4, p. 389-399
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Subject: | Bargaining | Endogenous protocol | Folk theorems | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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