Going short-term or long-term? : CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack
Year of publication: |
December 2016
|
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Authors: | Martin, Geoffrey P. ; Wiseman, Robert M. ; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. |
Published in: |
Strategic management journal. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 0143-2095, ZDB-ID 164405-1. - Vol. 37.2016, 12, p. 2463-2480
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Subject: | executive compensation | loss aversion | CEO decision making | temporal orientation | available slack | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Zeit | Time | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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