Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | You, Jung S. ; Juarez, Ruben |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 71.2021, 4, p. 1569-1589
|
Subject: | Resource-sharing | Cost-sharing | Implementation | Envy-free | VCG mechanisms | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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