Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

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Year of publication:	2004-07-02
Authors:	Bardhan, Pranab K. ; Singh, Nirvikar
Institutions:	EconWPA

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Development and Comp Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	33 pages, Acrobat .pdf 33 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D30 - Distribution. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; O10 - Economic Development. General ; P0 - Economic Systems. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005555986