Lineare Anreizverträge für Manager bei systematischen und unsystematischen Risiken
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gillenkirch, Robert M. |
Other Persons: | Velthuis, Louis (contributor) |
Published in: |
Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung : ZfbF. - Wiesbaden : Springer Gabler, ISSN 0341-2687, ZDB-ID 1086398-9. - Vol. 49.1997, 2, p. 121-140
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers |
-
Behavioral agency theory : new foundations for theorizing about executive compensation
Pepper, Alexander, (2015)
-
The role of affect in shaping the behavioral consequences of CEO option incentives
Zolotoy, Leon, (2019)
-
The interactive effect of monitoring and incentive alignment on agency costs
Martin, Geoffrey, (2019)
- More ...
-
Gillenkirch, Robert M., (2018)
-
Subjective Evaluations of Risk Taking Decisions Determinants and Consequences of Outcome Bias
Gillenkirch, Robert M., (2022)
-
Delegated risk‑taking, accountability, and outcome bias
Gillenkirch, Robert M., (2023)
- More ...