Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms

In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.<p>

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Year of publication:	2011-02-18
Authors:	Patel, Amrish ; Cartwright, Edward
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Handelshögskolan
Subject:	Signalling \| Conformity \| Social Norms \| Naïve Beliefs

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Extent:	text/html
Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers in Economics Number 488 13 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838964