Social norms and naïve beliefs

In this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Patel, Amrish ; Cartwright, Edward
Publisher:	Canterbury : University of Kent, Department of Economics
Subject:	Soziale Werte \| Altruismus \| Öffentliches Gut \| Signalling \| signalling \| conformity \| social norms \| naïve beliefs

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Series:	Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; 09,06
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	594004462 [GVK] hdl:10419/50592 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277821