Social Norms and Naive Beliefs

In this paper we analyse the effect that naive agents (those who take behaviour at "face value") have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naive inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naive agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.

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Year of publication:	2009-03
Authors:	Patel, Amrish ; Cartwright, Edward
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Kent
Subject:	Signalling \| Conformity \| Social Norms \| Naive beliefs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Studies in Economics. - ISSN 1466-0814.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635135