Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences

In this paper we study the rationing problems in using the issue of Nash implementation in an environment of single-crossing preferences. We show that strict monotonicity (i) implies strict weak no-veto power and unanimity and (ii) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, which is vacuously checked in this domain. We show that any social choice correspondence that has full range can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ahmed, Doghmi
Published in:	Mathematical Economics Letters. - De Gruyter. - Vol. 1.2014, 2-4, p. 6-6
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Subject:	Nash implementation \| Rationing problem \| Single-crossing preferences

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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