On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
In this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Ahmed, Doghmi ; Abderrahmane, Ziad |
Published in: |
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704. - Vol. 13.2013, 1, p. 14-14
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Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Saved in:
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