Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation : The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | MacLeod, W. Bentley |
Other Persons: | Tan, Teck Yong (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (65 p) |
---|---|
Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w22156 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2016 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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