Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Year of publication: |
05 January 2021
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Authors: | Agranov, Marina ; Dianat, Ahrash ; Samuelson, Larry ; Yariv, Leeat |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Matching | incomplete information | stability | Experiments | Theorie | Theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP15637 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
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Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...
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Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...