Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Year of publication: |
[2021]
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Authors: | Agranov, Marina ; Dianat, Ahrash ; Samuelson, Larry ; Yariv, Leeat |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Matching | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (45 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 4, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3759481 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...
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Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...