Produktverknüpfung bei Softwareangeboten – ökonomische Einordnung am Beispiel Microsoft
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Reisinger, Markus ; Wagner, Stefan |
Published in: |
Wirtschaftsdienst. - ISSN 1613-978X. - Vol. 103.2023, 3, p. 211-216
|
Publisher: |
Warsaw : Sciendo |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | German |
Other identifiers: | 10.2478/wd-2023-0055 [DOI] 1848949758 [GVK] hdl:10419/271717 [Handle] |
Classification: | K21 - Antitrust Law ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Source: |
-
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Produktverknüpfung bei Softwareangeboten : ökonomische Einordnung am Beispiel Microsoft
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Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment
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