When and how much to talk : credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | Garfinkel, Michelle Robin ; Oh, Seonghwan |
Publisher: |
Los Angeles |
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility |
Extent: | 23 Bl |
---|---|
Series: | Working papers / UCLA Department of Economics. - LosAngeles, Calif., ZDB-ID 2252216-5. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
The European monetary system : a flexible disciplinary device
Vitale, Giovanni, (1997)
-
Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
Sleet, Christopher, (2007)
-
Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments
Keefer, Philip, (2001)
- More ...
-
Strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information : optimal targeting periods
Garfinkel, Michelle Robin, (1990)
-
When and how much to talk : credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information
Garfinkel, Michelle Robin, (1995)
-
Strategic considerations in monetary policy with private information : can secrecy be avoided?
Oh, Seonghwan, (1990)
- More ...