The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Hörner, Johannes ; Olszewski, Wojciech |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 74.2006, 6, p. 1499-1544
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Subject: | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Theorie | Theory | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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