Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Signalling | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Econometrica Vol. 78, No. 5, p. 1673, September 2010 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 1, 2010 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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