The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 146.2011, 4, p. 1664-1683
|
Subject: | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Signalling | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Theorie | Theory |
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