The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Signalling |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (32 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 5, 2010 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1706269 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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