The problem of a firm willing to optimally promote and sell a single product on the market is here undertaken. The awareness of such product is modeled by means of a Nerlove–Arrow goodwill as a state variable, differentiated jointly by means of time and of age of the segments in which the...

The problem of a firm willing to optimally promote and sell a single product on the market is here undertaken. The awareness of such product is modeled by means of a Nerlove–Arrow goodwill as a state variable, differentiated jointly by means of time and of age of the segments in which the...

We analyze the connection between the optimal solutions of minimum time and fixed final time optimal control problems. We discuss some controllability conditions which guarantee the equivalence of the two problems. In fact, under such conditions, not only does an optimal control...

Open-loop Stackelberg equilibria in linear-state games are subgame perfect. This result holds under the hypothesis of unconstrained final state; whereas we need to take into account suitable final-state conditions in order to correctly formalize certain economic problems. A striking contribution...

We analyze the connection between the optimal solutions of minimum time and fixed final time optimal control problems. We discuss some controllability conditions which guarantee the equivalence of the two problems. In fact, under such conditions, not only does an optimal control...