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We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of the bidders' independent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with probability 1, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price,...
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We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...
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The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
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A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
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We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and--in economic environments--sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto...
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