We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

Value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) are popular risk measures from academic, industrial and regulatory perspectives. The problem of minimizing CVaR is theoretically known to be of a Neyman-Pearson type binary solution. We add a constraint on expected return to investigate...

This paper analyzes the determinants of governance transparency. In our model, entrepreneurs optimally decide the precision of their earning reporting by trading off the possibility of expropriating profits against the capacity to attract external funding.We find that information is only...

We study sources and implications of undiversified portfolios in a production-based asset pricing model with financial frictions. Households take concentrated positions in a single firm exposed to idiosyncratic shocks because managerial effort requires equity stakes, and because investors gain...