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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete more …, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help restore balance in agents' incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769
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Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations
Albanesi, Stefania; Olivetti, Claudia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper explores the hypothesis that gender wage differentials arise from the interaction between the intra-household allocation of labour and the contractual relation between firms and workers in the presence of private information on workers’ labour market attachment. In our model, if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661843
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Ethnic Diversity, Market Structure and Risk Sharing in Developing Countries
Jellal, Mohamed; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
The paper mainly addresses three questions: 1) do workers tend to be employed by employers of the same ethnic group; 2) what is the structure of the equilibrium wage contract; and 3) do more ethnically homogeneous labour markets tend to have different labour contracts than more ethnically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504419
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The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
fall in the value of the option, benefiting the principal. The indirect effect is a change in the agent's effort incentives … there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in volatility reduces effort incentives. As the agency problem weakens, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083624
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The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083536
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Performance Incentives with Award Constraints
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661877
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The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets versus Up-or-out
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Lammers, Frauke - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker’s status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083868
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Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
Muller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083501
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Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Top Executives
Albanesi, Stefania; Olivetti, Claudia; Prados, Maria José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201363
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The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs
Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender wage gap:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351518